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ABTRACT. Since 2001, the geo-strategic priorities of the ‘War on Terror’ have again drawn 
global attention to the historically significant region of Waziristan. Now widely regarded as a 
hotbed of terrorism, violence and anti-statism, Waziristan’s colonial history has been mined for 
‘useful’ lessons which might be applied to this contemporary conflict and its ongoing obsession 
with ‘securing’ and ‘pacifying’ dangerous sections of the globe. The instrumentalist bent of much 
of this work is problematic because it often reproduces the same reductive stereotypes and metrics 
of imperial success that appear in the colonial archives. This paper offers an alternate frame for 
writing the history of the colonial frontier through a re-examination of how British officials 
attempted to construct and impose their authority upon one of the region’s most powerful and 
politically important groups: the Mahsud Wazirs. By identifying a number of crucial, yet largely 
overlooked, continuities that characterized British efforts to ‘pacify’ the Mahsuds, this paper 
provides new insight into the quotidian ways in which an expanding colonial state attempted to 
constitute itself, as well as a more nuanced picture of how imperial power in this region was 
historically resisted and shaped by those it sought to control and subjugate. 
 
I 
 
Since 2001, the geo-strategic priorities of the ‘War on Terror’ have again drawn global attention 
to the historically significant region of Waziristan, a key and contested imperial periphery 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.1 Now widely regarded as a wellspring of 
terrorism, violence and anti-statism Waziristan’s colonial history has, ironically, been mined for 
‘lessons’ which might bear on contemporary efforts to ‘secure’ and ‘pacify’ dangerous spaces in 
the global south.2 The instrumentalist bent of much recent writing on Waziristan, and the frontier 
region more broadly, is problematic – not least because reading colonial policies in terms of their 
‘success’ and ‘failure’ normalises and dehistoricizes the imperial metrics of pacification upon 
which such judgements rest. If we want to better understand how British colonial power operated 
and avoid projecting colonial fallacies onto the present, we need alternate frames for writing the 
history of the frontier and different ways of thinking about the lessons of the imperial past. A more 
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critical reading is both possible and necessary. This paper sketches one possible approach by 
examining the practices and logics that shaped (and limited) British administration of the 
Waziristan frontier, focusing, in particular, on colonial engagements with the Mahsud Wazirs 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century. As one of the most powerful and politically 
important ‘tribes’ in the region, the Mahsuds’s interactions with the colonial state offer useful 
insights into the means through which imperial authority was constructed and contested.3  
Although the colonial archive provides rich and detailed accounts of the imperial past, few 
of the policy-makers and commentators seeking solutions for the present have questioned the 
perspectives, assumptions, and prejudices of these sources.4 These have also been processed into 
the historiography, much of which has focused on the activities of pioneering officers or on the 
machinations of diplomats, reproducing the tropes of religiosity, ‘fanaticism’ and otherness which 
structure the colonial archive.5 These readings proffer essentialized accounts of so-called ‘tribal’ 
populations and neatly periodized readings of frontier policies overdetermined by shifting imperial 
priorities. Christian Tripodi, for example, identifies four phases of colonial frontier policy in India. 
‘Each phase’, he suggests, ‘comprised a policy response to the prevailing grand strategic pre-
occupations of the time’.6 Under ‘forward’ policies, the colonial administration favoured the 
projection of military power and the use of punitive expeditions to secure tribal obedience; at other 
times, negotiation, persuasion, or ‘masterly inactivity’ were favoured. Even more nuanced 
readings of colonial engagements with the frontier reproduce this high-political schema.7 
This paper rejects the emphasis on rupture and discontinuity. Instead, it identifies clear and 
consistent patterns in colonial frontier administration, as well as in the ability of the region’s 
predominantly Pashtun inhabitants to respond to colonial interventions.8 Regardless of the 
prevailing ‘grand strategy’, colonial engagements on the frontier involved recurrent, if ostensibly 
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inconsistent, attempts to forcibly re-order social and political relationships with the Mahsuds. 
While violence was central to these projects, the imperial military was much more than a coercive 
force periodically called forth to exact revenge where the peace had been disturbed. Instead, the 
military was engaged in a range of material and epistemological endeavours which often supported 
more ‘conciliatory’ modes of intervention. These included attempts to engineer Mahsud loyalty 
through economic and political patronage, via land colonization schemes, paramilitary 
employment and the provision of tribal allowances. Tracing these strategies (and their limits) 
across the late nineteenth century not only provides us with important insight into the quotidian 
ways in which the expanding colonial state sought to constitute itself, but also offers a more 
nuanced picture of how colonial power responded to and was shaped by the actions of those it 
sought to control and subjugate. 
Though we seek to emphasise the ability of the frontier population to deflect and divert 
colonial expansion, we do not intend to suggest that the ‘recalcitrant’ nature of frontier society is 
principally an ‘effect’ of imperial expansion (be it British, Sikh, Mughal or otherwise). If tribal 
social organisation comprised a form of ‘institutionalised dissidence’, as Akbar S. Ahmed has 
suggested, it is equally revealing to examine colonial projects of rule as attempts to institutionalise 
new forms of obligation and quiescence. Assuming that ‘[e]thnicity and tribe begin where taxes 
and sovereignty end’, we need to better understand how this complementarity was produced.9 
Thus, in distinction to James C. Scott’s suggestive mapping of ‘Zomia’ as a place of refuge from, 
and resistance to, expanding state power, this paper traces the contours of more reciprocal 
exchanges between the settled districts of colonial Punjab and the hinterlands of the frontier. It 
argues that in Waziristan, the frontier encounter was a dialogic, symbiotic one in which both 
coercive and conciliatory modes reflected the material and epistemological foundations of the 
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colonial project of rule. Viewed from this perspective, colonial officers were at least as ‘fanatical’ 
in their adherence to these modes of thinking and governing as their local antagonists were in their 
engagements and resistance. Examining these parallels and limits offers an alternative to the 
simplistic and reductive pillaging of the imperial past for ‘useful’ lessons on the management of 
the imperial present. 
<PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1: MAP OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER c. 1901> 
 
II 
Although the northwest frontier has often been regarded as distinctive, the measures developed to 
administer the region were similar to schemes devised to pacify (or ‘civilise’) a host of different 
populations in colonial South Asia. Groups who did not conform to the ideal of the sedentarized, 
revenue-paying cultivator were stigmatized and depicted as ‘predatory’ and threatening to the 
interests and security of the colonial order.10 According to this logic, ‘predatory’, ‘tribal’, and 
‘criminal’ peoples forfeited their rights to the protections normally afforded by law, requiring 
instead to be pacified and policed through extraordinary – often violent – methods.11 Alongside 
legal and extra-legal violence, however, one of the principal mechanisms by which colonial 
administrators sought to create productive and quiescent subjects was through the creation of a 
land-owning class whose interests were coterminous with those of the British.12 Colonial officials 
envisioned the creation of peaceful, industrious, ‘civilized’, revenue-paying cultivators, whose 
loyalty would be ensured by their gratitude to the British as well as by a newfound prosperity from 
their legitimate agrarian pursuits. 
 As Robert Nichols and others have shown, similar strategies were employed on the 
northwest frontier, where irrigation and land grants, in concert with military employment and 
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pensions, were deployed as means of tying Pashtun interests to the state.13 In the early 1850s, for 
example, newly-irrigated land was granted to Pashtun tribesmen who had fought alongside the 
British in the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848-49). According to Reynell Taylor, the Deputy 
Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan:  
 
the effect of all is in a great measure to provide employment and subsistence for a number of 
deserving men, some of whom have fought for us in the field, and further, to colonise a tract of 
country hitherto only inhabited by unruly half-reclaimed Afghan classes, who have been but a few 
years subject to any Government at all, with a strong body of loyal and civilized men belonging to 
provinces long under strict subjection, and therefore likely to side with order and discipline against 
sedition, treachery, hill influence, &c.14 
 
As Taylor makes clear, these projects literally inscribed the colonial presence in the landscape, 
providing a material foundation for the reworking of relationships between the colonial state and 
its emerging subjects. Such colonization schemes, which typically went hand-in-hand with military 
and paramilitary recruitment, were initiated (to varying degrees of success) with nearly all of the 
frontier’s major Pashtun groups, including the Afridis, Wazirs, Gurchanis, Bhittanis, and Bugtis.15  
 By 1865, the only major frontier tribe without any settlements or lands in British territory 
were the Mahsuds of South Waziristan. Throughout the colonial period, the Mahsuds were 
regarded as amongst the most truculent and intractable tribes: in 1932, C.C. Davies reported that 
though ‘every endeavour was made to cultivate friendly relations… the tribesmen continued to 
murder our subjects and to harass our borders’.16 Davies lamented that ‘practically every 
conciliatory method and every form of coercion have been attempted, but, after the lapse of more 
than three-quarters of a century, no real solution has been discovered’.17 Davies presents colonial 
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policy torn between two apparently conflicting impulses: conciliatory attempts to civilize and 
coercive actions to compel submission. The distinction posited between ‘conciliation’ and ‘force’, 
however, obscures the fact that ‘punitive’ expeditions often worked in tandem with settlement 
programmes and other schemes for ‘pacification’ (including the payment of tribal allowances and 
paramilitary recruitment). 
 Typically mounted in retribution for ‘crimes’ committed within ‘British territory’, punitive 
expeditions were described in quasi-judicial terms. R.H. Davies, the Secretary to the Government 
of Punjab, wrote in 1865 that: ‘the despatch of an expedition into the hills is always in the nature 
of a judicial act. It is the delivery of a sentence, and the infliction of a punishment for international 
offences’.18 To inflict such punishment, colonial forces crossed the border and entered tribal 
territory to strike ‘rapid blows at vulnerable points’ before retreating. Eventually, these so-called 
‘butcher and bolt’ campaigns gave way to larger operations which called for more protracted 
occupation of tribal territory in order to ‘thoroughly master the enemies’ country and dictate terms 
at leisure in their midst’.19 By the turn of the twentieth century, doctrinal instruction on conducting 
such ‘small wars’ was widely circulated and frontier campaigning elicited considerable popular 
interest and a good deal of salacious reportage, some of which has reproduced in the 
historiography.20 The reality of frontier warfare, however, was typically less romantic than popular 
writings suggested. Because tribal populations usually retreated in the face of advancing colonial 
forces, frontier campaigns offered few opportunities for sustained military engagements. As a 
result, ‘mastering the enemy’s territory’ demanded a spatial and material performance, in which 
colonial troops undertook symbolic route marches through tribal territory, seizing grain and 
fodder, and destroying forts, villages, and other tribal infrastructure.21 Mapping and surveying 
provided further opportunities to ‘master’ tribal territory and extend colonial dominion. Like 
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settlement schemes, military expeditions invariably revolved around attempts to physically re-
order the economic and material conditions in which the frontier’s inhabitants lived. 
 Although recent scholarship on India’s northwest frontier provides a useful starting point 
for thinking about how authority was constituted along the imperial periphery, the general thrust 
of this work has tended to exaggerate the ‘exceptional’ nature of this encounter.22 While colonial 
authorities undoubtedly conceived of the frontier and its inhabitants as distinct from the rest of 
India, they also tenaciously clung to the belief that the ‘frontier tribes’ might someday be fashioned 
into conventionally productive colonial subjects. ‘Frontier governmentality’ was thus more similar 
to David Scott’s notion of ‘colonial governmentality’ than is often acknowledged.23 Moreover, 
with its prevailing focus on the state’s legal and administrative apparatus, much recent work has 
overlooked the crucial ways that ‘frontier governmentality’ was equally, and in some ways more 
importantly, assembled  through material interventions.  
As we shall see, economic conciliation and military coercion were complementary 
components of a wider strategy that sought to establish new relations of force to facilitate the 
domination of frontier populations in novel and pervasive ways. Ostensibly ‘conciliatory’ methods 
attempted to discipline tribal populations by inculcating new forms of sedentary or bonded labour, 
often aided by military and paramilitary recruitment. Punitive expeditions worked to erode the 
ability of tribal groups to resist and evade colonial authority by both destroying their material 
capacity to sustain themselves independently, and by rendering their territory more legible and 
thus more vulnerable to future incursions by the state. Thus, rather than being discrete spheres or 
tools of colonial governance, these methods actually bled into one another. On the northwest 
frontier, colonial governmentality inhered in forms of knowledge, property, and labour just as 
much as in law, and in the physical acts of destruction perpetrated by the military. The violence of 
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the colonial frontier was therefore at once more dispersed, and at the same time more proscribed, 
than is typically understood. To chart the history of this violence more clearly, the following 
section turns to Waziristan and to colonial relations with the Mahsuds.  
 
III 
Following the annexation of Punjab in 1849, the Mahsuds swiftly emerged as a disruptive and 
dangerous presence on the colonial frontier.24 The tribe was held responsible for a variety of 
infractions, including ‘raids’ against villages in British territory and attacks on the Powindah 
caravans that plied annual trade routes through the Gomal valley.25 Matters were brought to a head 
in 1860, when 3,000 Mahsuds, led by Janji Khan, a prominent malik (chief), attacked the town of 
Tank. Though the raiders were turned back and Janji Khan was killed, the boldness of the attack 
was taken as evidence that colonial influence on the frontier was under-developed.26 As a result, 
an expeditionary force – comprising more than 5,000 troops and 1,600 irregulars under the 
command of Major General Sir Neville Chamberlain – was dispatched against the Mahsuds in 
March 1860 to ‘exact satisfaction for the past and security for the future’.27  
 Contrary to colonial expectations, the Mahsuds made no attempt to resist the initial advance 
of colonial troops.28 In fact, apart from a single incident in which a reconnaissance party was 
engaged by a small number of tribesmen, colonial forces found few opportunities to close with the 
Mahsuds. In the absence of tribal submission and in lieu of opportunities for a direct confrontation, 
Chamberlain sent troops to destroy fortifications and habitations associated with the late Jangi 
Khan. To underline the punitive purpose of the operations, property belonging to another Mahsud 
malik not involved in the raid on Tank was spared ‘purposely to mark the distinction between the 
conduct of the two men’.29 While the expedition’s advance parties proceeded unopposed, the 
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Mahsuds launched a large counter-attack on the reserve camp on 23 April, prompting the 
expansion of colonial operations to punish the tribe as a whole. On 5 May, colonial forces set out 
for the more distant settlement of Kaniguram, which was believed to be the principal town in South 
Waziristan. Kaniguram was occupied until 9 May, and was spared only after the town’s inhabitants 
offered to pay a fine. As no submission had been received from the Mahsuds, the colonial force 
withdrew, ‘setting fire to everything which had been protected on its upward march’.30 
Indicatively, when troops moved beyond Mahsud territory, fodder and provisions were paid for, 
signaling the punitive calculus which underpinned their earlier plundering.  
Although colonial troops destroyed a significant amount of Mahsud property and killed a 
number of tribesmen, the expedition withdrew without securing the tribe’s official submission. 
Rather glossing over this fact, the official history recorded that the expedition was a great success. 
If the occupation of Kanigorum was intended to demonstrate the ability of colonial troops to strike 
deep into Mahsud territory, it was the destruction of tribal property and foodstuffs which 
constituted the truly ‘punitive’ effects of the expedition. Chamberlain emphasized the necessity of 
the material assault against tribal property:  
 
If objection be taken to the nature of the punishment inflicted as repugnant to civilization, 
the answer is that, savages cannot be met and checked by the rule of civilized warfare; and 
that to spare their houses and crops would be to leave them unpunished, and therefore 
unrestrained.31 
 
The trope of ‘savagery’ which inflects Chamberlain’s pre-empted criticism of the methods adopted 
and disguised the inability of colonial troops to engage, much less to defeat, the Mahsuds. In this 
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sense, the methods adopted during the 1860 expedition suggest the limits of imperial military 
power as much as they reflect the unique demands of ‘savage warfare’. Undaunted, Chamberlain 
declared himself to be ‘sanguine’ about the effects of the operations, concluding that ‘sooner or 
later the result of the expedition will be to bring about a state of peace hitherto unknown on this 
blood stained border’.32 In fact, the  expedition did little to bring about the radical shift in the 
tribe’s disposition and the Mahsuds came to terms in 1861 only after a protracted and costly 
blockade (bandish).  
Given the impossibility of obtaining a decisive military victory and the impracticality of 
maintaining an indefinite blockade of their territory, frontier officials began to envision alternative 
ways of pacifying the Mahsuds. In December of 1861, Taylor remarked that British policy towards 
the Mahsuds had hitherto failed to address and reform the underlying causes of the tribe’s 
misconduct. ‘We have to change the hereditary habits of the most unruly subdivisions of a 
proverbially unruly tribe’, he wrote, proposing that the best method of doing so would be to ‘locate 
a portion of these plundering subdivisions’ on agricultural lands, in order to substitute agriculture 
for their ‘natural employment’.33 Taylor hoped that the establishment of ‘Mahsud colonies’ would 
both inculcate ‘agricultural habits’ and reduce raiding. In 1865, S.F. Graham, the Deputy 
Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, similarly argued that ‘the only way to reform this tribe and to 
give peace and prosperity to this part of the border is... to offer to the Mahsoods... a more legitimate 
field for the display of their energy and spirit by giving some of them service on their border and 
lands on which others may locate in our territory.”34  
Although skeptical of the scheme, Viceroy John Lawrence agreed that Graham’s proposal 
‘should have a fair trial on account of its great importance’.35 To this end, he approved a budget 
of Rs. 5,000 to facilitate the settlement of Mahsud ‘colonists’, provide agricultural implements, 
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and to purchase cattle as well as shelter and food until cultivation had been sufficiently established 
that they could begin supporting themselves.36 The scheme specified that the Mahsuds be granted 
rent-free land for ten years in the area surrounding Tank, as well as employment in the frontier 
militia. Wasteland was selected from tracts between the Sheorani Hills and the cultivated Gomal 
Valley, both to avoid upsetting existing proprietary claims and because of the area’s favourable 
potential for irrigation. Secretary of State for India George Robinson gave his personal blessing to 
the project, asserting that ‘The pacification of border tribes by humanising influences is more likely 
to be permanent than their subjection by military force’.37 Colonial optimism, however, proved to 
be premature and the project was abandoned in 1866 due to deteriorating relations with the 
Mahsuds, ostensibly caused by disputes over the distribution of land and militia positions to the 
various subdivisions within the tribe.38 The failure of the stillborn settlement scheme seemed to 
vindicate those critics who doubted the viability of such ‘humanising influences’. According to 
one report from December of 1866, ‘It is evident... that it is the excitement, honour, and impunity 
of a life of plunder, and not the want of other means of livelihood, that cause the incessant 
misbehaviour of these mountain tribes’.39  
Despite the failure of the first settlement scheme, and the persistence of essentialist 
readings of Pashtun society, interest in establishing a Mahsud colony was revived in January of 
1877 after malik Gholam Nabbi Khan formally petitioned the Punjab Government for grants of 
wasteland in the Tank Valley. In return, Nabbi Khan promised to establish villages on these lands 
and to encourage members of his clan to settle and ‘reside there as British subjects’.40 The new 
scheme was embraced by both the Punjab Government and the Government of India (GOI). 
Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan C.E. Macaulay gave his full backing to Nabbi Khan’s 
proposal, asserting it would produce ‘great political advantage’ by strengthening British influence 
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and encouraging the Mahsuds to accept responsibility for guarding the Gomal Pass.41 ‘Once the 
Mahsuds acquire the habit of leaving the hills and cultivating land in British territory’, he wrote, 
‘I think in the course of a few years the habits of the whole tribe would undergo considerable 
change, and our power of control over them would be strengthened in a very decided degree’.42 
Lieutenant-Governor Robert Davies was equally optimistic, reporting to the Government of India 
that the Mahsuds were finally prepared to abandon their predatory ways and enter into a new era 
of peaceful cooperation.43 To facilitate this transition, the GOI sanctioned the purchase of 3,618 
acres of land, and two hundred ‘leading’ families of the three main branches of the Mahsuds – the 
Alizais, Shaman Khels, and Bahlolzais – were settled in British territory.44 The revival of the 
scheme reflected the persistent assumption that settling the Mahsuds would produce a radical 
change in their behaviour, making the tribesmen into quiescent and productive colonial subjects. 
For a time, it appeared that some progress was being made; in 1878, one official claimed that ‘the 
plains of Tank, never formerly at rest from Mahsud outrages, enjoyed an unexampled security of 
life and property’.45 
This unprecedented peace, however, was ‘rudely broken’ on 1 January 1879 when between 
2,000 and 3,000 tribesmen attacked the town of Tank, sacking the bazaar and looting significant 
amounts of property. This ‘gross and open violation of British territory’ was instigated by Umar 
Khan, son of the late Janji Khan. Umar Khan appears to have been motivated by a combination of 
his desire to avenge the death of his father, resentment at having been side-stepped as the main 
channel of communication between Macaulay and the Mahsuds in favour of Nabbi Khan, and his 
loyalty to the Afghan Amir, Sher Ali Khan.46 Seizing upon the widespread disaffection that 
permeated the frontier in the wake of the recent British invasion of Afghanistan at the 
commencement of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), Umar Khan heeded Sher Ali 
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Khan’s exhortations to wage jihad against the British and rallied his supporters to attack Tank.47 
This incident reveals not only the complex and entangled political loyalties at stake on the frontier, 
but also demonstrates the considerable influence that a single, disgruntled Mahsud leader could 
have in upsetting the delicate alliance the British were attempting to forge with other members of 
the tribe. The assault on Tank confounded the optimistic assessments which had accompanied the 
resurrected settlement scheme and sparked a series of uprisings along the frontier.48 The 
pacification of the Mahsuds – and of the Waziristan frontier more generally – seemed as distant in 
1879 as it had following the first attack on Tank in 1860.  
 
IV 
With the Indian Army occupied by the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the colonial authorities had 
limited means to seek redress for the 1879 raid. A blockade was re-established to prevent the 
Mahsuds from entering or trading with British territory, though its effectiveness was constrained 
by the fact that the tribe remained less dependent than other Pashtun groups on trade with British 
India.49 It was not until 1881, after the cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan, that a punitive 
expedition was finally sent to ‘settle’ the affair.  
The stated objectives of the 1881 expedition were to recover property plundered in the 
1879 raid, extract payment of a Rs. 30,000 fine, and compel the surrender of the six headmen who 
were believed to be the ringleaders of the attack. Typically, the expedition was meant to project 
colonial power and authority by demonstrating the capacity of British troops to penetrate Mahsud 
territory and bring the tribe to heel by disrupting their means of subsistence.50 Far from being 
barren fastnesses, as was often suggested, the commander of the Punjab Frontier Force, T.R.G. 
Kennedy, noted that Mahsud territory was home to ‘elaborate’ and ‘ingenious’ irrigation systems. 
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In preparing his plans for the expedition, Kennedy requested a detachment of 300 Mazhabi Sikh 
pioneers to dismantle the irrigation works, arguing that their destruction ‘would cause great loss’.51  
Further, he proposed to threaten annual expeditions timed to destroy the crops upon which the tribe 
relied.52 Though rather fantastical, the proposal indicates that the logic of frontier warfare was 
calculated not in conventional military terms, but as a means of imposing a regularized, temporal 
discipline upon the tribes. While the colonization schemes of the preceding decades had sought to 
control the tribesmen by settling them as pastoralists and agriculturalists, the punitive expeditions 
aimed to discipline the Mahsuds by undermining their ability to sustain these practices 
independently.  
Although Kennedy’s proposal for annual expeditions was rejected, the Punjab Government 
insisted that the 1881 expedition should demonstrate the capacity of colonial troops to penetrate 
and disrupt Mahsud territory. The Punjab Government instructed the commanding officer that ‘the 
force should traverse and explore as much of the Mahsud hills as possible, and… your operations 
should be deliberate and free from all appearance of haste’.53 While the performative logic here is 
clear enough, these operations also offered opportunities to seize tribal crops and property and to 
consolidate colonial knowledge. Some 300 square miles of the frontier were mapped, and a number 
of nearby peaks triangulated. According to one report, ‘Much new country has been unveiled and 
valuable survey operations have been secured’.54 Here, as in previous operations, strategic and 
economic imperatives were complementary. The penetration and exploration of tribal territory 
involved requisitioning food and supplies, straining the Mahsud economy, while the collection of 
cartographic and ecological information rendered the tribe more susceptible to future economic 
disruptions effected by the colonial state.55 Frontier warfare, as Akbar S. Ahmed points out, was 
‘invariably linked with the pattern of crops and cultivation’, and the colonial state readily 
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appropriated and exploited this connection.56  
The 1881 operations also reflect the fact that, as in 1860, the Mahsuds chose to harry and 
harass rather than confront the expeditionary forces. According to the official report, neither of the 
force’s two columns were seriously engaged during the operations. In the absence of decisive 
military encounters, cartographic conquests provided a convenient and quantifiable proxy to 
demonstrate the expedition’s ‘success’. However, for all the optimism conveyed in military 
accounts of the 1881 operations, there is little to suggest that the expedition was a success. When 
colonial troops were withdrawn a month after operations began, none of the principal objectives 
had been secured: the tribe had not submitted, no fines had been paid, and the ringleaders and 
stolen property from the 1879 raid remained at large. Indeed, it was only four months after the 
conclusion of the expedition that the Mahsuds came to terms. In return for the lifting of the 
blockade, several of the individuals wanted for the raid on Tank were delivered into colonial 
custody, and a further 80 hostages were made over in the hope of improving security on the 
frontier.57 By this point, the fines incurred by the tribe had reached such a level that the outstanding 
amount was converted into a tax on Mahsud goods traded in India.58 This conversion suggests, 
once again, the confluence of military and economic engagements along the frontier. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that one of the staples of frontier intelligence – and one of the measures used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of intervention – was the price of grain.59 Grain was not only one of the 
‘sinews’ of guerilla warfare, as Richard Temple claimed in 1856,60 but was also one of the 
mechanisms through which a new form of colonial order was negotiated on the frontier. Indeed, 
following the conclusion of operations in 1881, the Pioneer speculated that the Mahsud maliks 
eventually submitted because further hostilities might disrupt that year’s ‘extraordinarily fine 
crops’.61  
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The 1881 expedition, like the abortive settlement scheme it succeeded, sought to establish 
novel forms of control along the frontier by reorganizing material relations between the colonial 
state and the tribe. This was not simply ‘butcher and bolt’: the occupations and negotiations were 
protracted, and reflected the ideological, technological, and epistemological apparatus on which 
frontier campaigning depended. Thus configured, military interventions bore much in common 
with the less familiar settlement and colonization schemes, particularly in their attempt to establish 
more pervasive and permanent forms of control. Whether through the destruction of the Mahsuds’s 
material capacity to resist, the mapping of tribal territory, or the attempt to impose more 
regularized forms of extractive taxation, punitive expeditions – like the settlement schemes – 
represented attempts by the colonial state to engineer new forms of governance along the frontier.  
Following the ‘submission’ of 1881 a period of relative stability prevailed on the South 
Waziristan frontier. Trade through the Gomal Pass was reopened, and the Mahsuds agreed to 
provide an escort for a survey party’s visit to the pass in 1883. Optimistically, colonial officials 
attributed this change to the effects of the late expedition, and some began to press again for the 
resurrection of the colonization schemes. In April 1882, E.L. Ommanney, the Commissioner of 
Derajat, claimed that the ‘complete submission’ obtained from the Mahsuds in the wake of the 
1881 expedition was proof that the tribe was finally ready to reform its unruly ways by taking up 
residence in British territory as settled agriculturalists.62 With support from both the Punjab 
Government and the Government of India, officials set about dividing the land previously 
purchased for the 1877-79 scheme, and 40 Mahsud families were gradually settled in the colony 
between 1882 and 1887. 
 Early assessments of the new scheme were positive. In 1884, the Gazetteer of the Bannu 
District reported that ‘the interposition of colonies of Waziris between the more settled portion of 
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the plains and the hills has, more than any measure, tended to secure the peace of the frontier. 
Experience has shown too, that these rough mountaineers are capable of being tamed and 
converted into peaceful agriculturists.63 Despite this initial optimism, enthusiasm for the project 
quickly cooled. In February of 1885, S.S. Thorburn, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail 
Khan, reported that many of the Mahsud ‘colonists’ were merely using the land to ‘squat’ 
temporarily during the cold season, and were returning to the hills in the hot weather. Very few, 
he added, were cultivating the land themselves, relying instead on the use of Jat agricultural 
labourers. Thorburn’s report cast severe doubts on the practicability of the colonization scheme, 
concluding that too few families were settled on the land to effect a radical change in the behaviour 
of the entire tribe.64 G.M. Ogilvie, the new Deputy Commissioner, came to the same conclusion 
two years later in 1887, warning that ‘the settlement of a few will not civilize the rest’.65 
 Scepticism increased the following year when large numbers of armed men prevented a 
colonial survey party from mapping the Gomal Pass. As a result, the ‘hostages’ given in 1881 were 
dismissed, confirming that the practice of hostage-taking was essentially a means of incentivizing 
the tribe’s good behavior. By 1892, it was clear that the settlement project was running out of 
steam. In March of that year, Ogilvie’s successor, L.W. King, reported that fewer than 30 families 
were living on the land, cultivating a meagre total of 66 acres. From this, he concluded that the 
Mahsuds showed ‘little or no predilection for agricultural pursuits’. For King, the only way to 
teach the Mahsuds the true value of possessing these lands was by fostering a sense of private 
ownership, something which the previous schemes had failed to achieve. As he put it, ‘these lands 
have hitherto been regarded as the joint property of the whole tribe, which acts as a bar to 
individual interest’.66 In light of all this, King came to the view that the initial British goal of 
permanently settling a large portion of the tribe was unworkable.  
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Pessimism was reinforced in 1894 when certain Mahsuds frustrated yet another attempt to 
survey the frontier during the demarcation of the new Indo-Afghan border. While the fixing of the 
‘Durand Line’ is often read as evidence of a more assertive ‘forward policy’, the attempt to delimit 
the frontier brings into focus the precarious nature of colonial authority in South Waziristan. 
Though the survey party was accompanied by a substantial military escort, a tribal force numbering 
between two and three thousand men mounted a surprise attack at Wana on the night of 2 
November 1894, killing 45, wounding 75, and carrying off a substantial haul of rifles and other 
property. In response, a third punitive expedition was organized against the Mahsuds in December 
of 1894. The expedition demanded the surrender of the ringleaders of the attack at Wana and the 
restoration of the stolen property, as well as the expulsion from Mahsud territory of Mulla 
Powindah, who was acquiring some notoriety as an anti-colonial leader.67 The 1894 expedition 
proceeded in much the same manner as the earlier campaigns, with colonial troops finding few 
opportunities to directly engage tribal forces.68 Operations continued until March of the following 
year, and were consigned mainly to symbolic attacks on the villages and property of those sections 
thought to be implicated in the attack at Wana. Colonial forces seized large quantities of grain and 
animals, and destroyed towers and settlements belonging to hostile sections.69 
When the last of the wanted men finally surrendered themselves in March, the colonial 
account with the Mahsuds was deemed ‘settled’.70 Though there were ‘very few’ Mahsud 
casualties during the operations, the expedition was said to have been ‘absolutely successful’. ‘All 
sections of the Mahsud tribe concerned in the attack at Wana were severely punished’, the report 
continued, and ‘our troops penetrated into the remotest glens of the Mahsud country, and lifted the 
“purdah” from the enemy’s most inaccessible strongholds’.71 While the performative logic of these 
operations is again clear, it is also noteworthy that the 1895 settlement once more sought material, 
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as well as symbolic, submission from the Mahsuds. The tribe was required to discharge all 
outstanding fines, then standing at Rs. 12,828. At the same time, the tribe’s annual allowances 
were increased by more than Rs. 10,000. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Mahsuds ‘cheerfully 
subscribed’ to the terms proposed.72 Through these payments it was hoped that ‘legitimate and 
influential’ maliks could be mobilized to assist in the pacification of the tribe.  
Similar motives prompted Commissioner of Derajat Richard Bruce to attempt another 
revitalize the settlement scheme. In 1896, in accordance with Bruce’s plan, the Punjab Government 
offered the Mahsuds 8,600 acres of new land located along the Kot Azam inundation canal.73 As 
a further incentive, the government sanctioned the construction of hamlets for any would-be 
settlers.74 To address the problems identified in previous schemes, new conditions were introduced 
to increase the grantees’s ties to the land. Grants were made unalienable by either sale or mortgage, 
and had to be worked exclusively by Mahsud tenants, whose good conduct was the responsibility 
of their respective maliks. Maliks also had to ensure they provided tenants to at least half their 
lands within a period of 12 months, and that all their lands were occupied within 18 months.75 
These new terms were intended by Bruce to promote the sense of private ownership and individual 
interest that King and others had argued were lacking in previous colonization schemes.  
While the architects and proponents of successive colonization schemes were eager to 
emphasize their innovations, the novelty of their schemes seems often to have been exaggerated, 
presumably as a means of self-promotion; the tactics may have varied across time, but the broad 
strategy and mechanisms remained the same. The so-called ‘maliki’ system championed by Bruce, 
for instance, operated in much the same way as the earlier attempts to reorient the material and 
political bases of Mahsud society into structures that were intelligible for and amenable to British 
governance. In relying on the Mahsud maliks to use their influence and ability to persuade or co-
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opt their fellow tribesmen, it also drew on methods pioneered by Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan. 
Whether as attempts to induce wide sections of the Mahsuds to settle in British territory, or to 
create an influential group of maliks with propertied interests, British strategy sought to re-order 
the social, political, legal, and economic relations between the tribe and the colonial state. 
The apparent inconsistencies of frontier policy – shifting from coercion to conciliation, 
forward to close border – thus disguise broader continuities across the period in question. The 
evolving relationship between the Mahsuds and the colonial state was shaped less by the dictates 
of metropolitan strategy than by recurring engagements which reflected the modes of governance 
on which colonialism in India developed. Both coercive and conciliatory modes worked to 
restructure economic and material relations between the Mahsuds and the colonial state. 
Expeditions, like the settlement schemes, sought to impose new forms of discipline calculated to 
effect novel relations of domination and subordination. While these relations could be mobilized 
through the disruption of tribal pastoralism or the irrigation and subsidy of colonial agriculture, 
the wider objectives of colonial rule are more clearly signified by the recurrent, and determined 
attempts to penetrate, survey and subordinate tribal populations and territory. It is important to 
emphasize that the broad similarities between these methods do not reflect a singular or coherent 
strategy devised by frontier officers. Rather, they are better understood as reflections of the 
colonial state’s fundamental orientation toward refashioning Indian society by asserting political, 
legal, and material control over property relations more generally.76 At the same time, the ready 
resistance that confronted these schemes suggests a calculating and reflexive opposition on the 
part of the tribes. It was the dialogic interaction of these forces which shaped the unfolding of 
colonial history on the frontier.  
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V 
On 27 November 1907, less than two years after returning from the Viceroyalty of India, George 
Nathaniel Curzon delivered the annual Romanes Lecture on the subject of ‘Frontiers’ to a packed 
audience at the University of Oxford. Frontiers, Curzon claimed, were ‘the razor’s edge on which 
hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations’.77 ‘The Roman 
Empire’, he continued, ‘nowhere so near like our own as in its Frontier policy and experience... 
finally broke up and perished because it could not maintain its Frontiers intact against the 
barbarians’. To avoid following the Romans into decline, Curzon urged the development of what 
he called a ‘science’ of frontier management through which the unruly and ‘fanatical’ inhabitants 
of the world’s frontiers might be tamed.  
Throughout his time as Viceroy (1899-1905), Curzon had devoted considerable energy to 
overhauling the administration of India’s notoriously ‘turbulent’ and strategically vital northwest 
frontier.78 While his vision of the frontier evoked romanticised notions of chivalry and adventure, 
Curzon’s prescription for a more ‘scientific’ frontier administration reflected a preference for 
streamlined imperial governance and, in particular, a desire to reduce military expenditure.79 When 
juxtaposed against the putative ‘forward policy’ of his immediate predecessors, Curzon’s 
administration appears to mark a significant shift in the nature of colonial frontier policy: while 
thirteen punitive expeditions were despatched to the northwest frontier in the 1890s, none were 
undertaken during Curzon’s term as Viceroy. This purported shift has since been reproduced in 
much of the existing historiography, reinforcing the perception that the colonial administration of 
the frontier was overdetermined by radically changing strategic priorities. However, while Curzon, 
like the more junior officials he directed, was at pains to emphasize the novelty of his approach, a 
more careful reading of the evidence from Waziristan suggests an alternative interpretation.   
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When Curzon assumed the Viceroyalty in 1899, colonial relations with the Mahsuds were 
problematic and, despite the various expeditions and colonization schemes, the frontier remained 
‘unsettled’. Though the Mahsuds had been ‘quiet’ during the 1897 Uprising, trade through the 
Gomal Pass remained vulnerable, and over the next several years, Mahsud tribesmen were 
responsible for a series of thefts, raids, murders, and kidnappings of British subjects. Matters were 
brought to a head in October of 1900, when a party of Mahsuds attacked a militia post, killing two 
and capturing ten Snider rifles. By this point, the sum of unpaid fines owed by the tribe had reached 
a staggering Rs. 1,87,000. As a result, in early November, W.R.H. Merk, the Commissioner of 
Derajat, convened a tribal jirga at Tank and demanded the Mahsuds settle the outstanding amount. 
The tribe’s request for two months’s grace to assemble the money was refused. On 1 December 
1900, another blockade against Mahsud territory was implemented.80 While payments towards the 
fine were received by the colonial authorities throughout 1901, further offences continued during 
this period. It was thus decided that the blockade would be ‘amplified’ by punitive raids against 
Mahsud villages. The effects were said to be significant.81 In a telegram to H.A. Deane, the 
Commissioner of the newly-created North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Merk reported that 
the combined effect of the blockade and attacks produced more suffering than in any of the 
previous operations.82 In January of 1902, the tribe’s leading men sent in letters of submission.  
The ‘enhanced blockade’ operated in much the same way as the previous expeditions: the 
punishment of the tribe was effected via the destruction of property and resources. Though these 
operations often included a performative element, colonial attempts to discipline the Mahsuds 
continued to operate principally in the material sphere.83 Merk clearly recognized that the 
pacification of the Mahsuds could never be achieved through coercion alone. Allowances and 
employment in the militia and as labourers on construction and work projects, Merk believed, 
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would help the Mahsuds to be ‘broken into sepoys’.84 Even the more cautious Deane allowed 
himself to muse that the late blockade might finally succeed in obtaining the radical transformation 
that British authorities so desperately desired.85 Other frontier officials, however, were less 
optimistic. Noting that arms trafficking had increased dramatically in the last few years,86 P. Pipon 
speculated that instead of using their tribal allowances and profits from the colony to promote 
peaceful agricultural interests, many maliks and other tribesmen were using them to purchase 
weapons.87 Attacks on the militia in order to obtain highly-prized Snider rifles were also common. 
Following one such attack in May 1902, Nazam Khan, a member of the South Waziristan militia, 
claimed that the man who stole his rifle shouted: ‘The Feringis have said that they are going to 
settle us, there, that’s our answer’.88 Some colonial officials suspected that the militia colluded 
with the attackers, and there was widespread anxiety that many recruits enlisted with ulterior 
motives.89 
 Pipon expressed similar concerns about the Mahsud colony, which he thought had become 
a haven for criminality. According to him, the tribesmen had not only abused and intimidated those 
charged with overseeing and assessing the colony’s progress, but had used it both as a staging 
ground for raids into British territory and as a repository for arms and stolen goods. As he saw it: 
‘there is no doubt the colony had the worst influence on surrounding clans.  It was, as a Gundapur 
Khan dryly described it, a “school of badmashi [criminality] opened by Government for the 
instruction of our young men”’.90  Just as Mahsud ‘hostages’ used the allowances and access they 
were granted to British territory in order to arm themselves with superior weapons, the colonists 
and militia men appropriated the resources provided in order to subvert them for their own ends.91 
While it is hardly surprising that some officials worried about the ‘disintegrating effect’ of colonial 
interventions, their various responses were invariably overdetermined by essentialist readings of 
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Mahsud society.92 In their successive and competing attempts to adapt governance to take account 
of the supposed peculiarities of the tribal society, colonial officials created numerous opportunities 
for the Mahsuds to appropriate and exploit the largesse of an expanding colonial state and its 
aspiring officials.  
 
VI 
Despite the innovations and investments of over four decades, the long-awaited pacification of the 
Mahsuds remained a chimera. Dismayed frontier officials were increasingly confronted with the 
realization that their efforts to ‘civilize’ the Mahsuds had done little to subordinate the tribe. 
Further punitive expeditions were launched in 1917, 1919, and 1921, and another major campaign 
took place in 1936-37.93 Despite the increasing application of airpower, and a variety of other 
innovations, colonial control over Waziristan was so tenuous as to be negligible. Upon reading 
Evelyn Howell’s 1931 history of British relations with the Mahsuds, one colonial official was said 
to have lamented, ‘what a record of futility it all is!’94 
Though it is perhaps tempting to read Waziristan’s postcolonial history in relation to the 
putative ‘failure’ of colonial governance, such an approach would reproduce the Whiggish 
assumption that ‘progress’ towards modern forms of nation and statehood is natural. To understand 
colonial relations with the Mahsuds, both the process of colonial state-building and the categories 
through which it was made intelligible (nation, state, tribe) require historicization. We should not, 
therefore, depict colonial policies in terms of their ‘failure’ or their ‘success’. Rather, we should 
examine how novel forms of colonial intervention were assembled and resisted along the frontier. 
Such an approach reveals the dynamic and contested nature of colonial state-building and helps us 
to better understand how colonial governance rested on, and helped to shape, representations of 
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frontier. 
While calculated to mitigate day-to-day administrative problems (and to burnish careers 
and reputations), the projects this paper has examined – both military and civilian – also reflected 
and sustained the interventionist and expansionist logics on which colonial rule depended. The 
collapse of colonization schemes and other ‘conciliatory’ methods justified the use of military 
expeditions, and the apparent inefficiency of these expeditions in turn compelled colonial officials 
– keen, like their colleagues in the military, to advance their own careers – to explore alternative 
modes of pacification. The ‘record of futility’ inscribed in the imperial archive thus partly reflects 
the iterative workings of the colonial state, and the bureaucracy on which it depended. Though the 
minutes, despatches and reports produced by colonial officials inevitably stress the novelty and 
promise of their own labours, while frequently denigrating those who preceded them – as Merk 
did to Bruce, and Curzon to earlier Viceroys –  historians need to look beyond these claims to 
discern the modes and forms through which colonial authority was constructed and contested. The 
co-constitution of ‘tribe’ and ‘state’ may be traced in the constrained evolution of colonial practices 
as much as in the proverbially redoubtable ‘nature’ of tribal social structures. While there is a 
considerable literature on the latter95, much less attention has been paid to the ways in which 
colonial projects may be read to reveal the contingencies and limits of imperial power.   
From this perspective, violence was not only a key vector for the expansion of colonial 
influence in South Waziristan but also a means by which that expansion could be resisted, deflected 
and appropriated. Contrary to the romanticized vision of frontier warfare bequeathed by Kipling 
and Churchill, however, this violence only rarely involved direct conflict between colonial troops 
and tribal forces. Even when the Indian Army took the field to ‘punish’ the Mahsuds, that 
punishment was invariably constituted through material depredation rather than military 
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engagement.96 The strategic calculus which shaped frontier warfare overlapped and extended the 
forms of pacification attempted through settlement schemes, blockades and militia service. In 
seeking to forcibly remake the relationship between tribal populations and the colonial government 
– to dissuade raiding or to ‘humanise’ the tribes – such projects rested on similar forms of 
knowledge and mobilized equivalent dispositions of force, reflecting the epistemological and 
material scaffolds of colonial state-building. 
While the exceptional nature of colonial law on the frontier has now been recognized,97 the 
epistemic violence of colonial jurisprudence depended on a wider apparatus of colonial violence. 
The legal and juridical frames through which colonialism attempted to assert itself were equally 
dependent on those military and civilian projects that gave British rule its material form along the 
frontier. The territorialization of colonial governmentality was marched along the frontier by 
sepoys and militia men, inscribed by the pens of surveyors, and dug into the land via canals, 
fortifications and settlements. While these instantiations were often fleeting and frequently flawed, 
we should not lose sight of the many ways in which colonial governmentality was realized by these 
schemes, as much as by judges and administrators.98  
Neither must we lose sight of the limits of this form of rule. As we have seen, the 
territorialization of colonial rule was an unstable, fractured and ultimately incomplete project.99 
The complexities of colonial governance along the frontier reflected the complexity of the local 
societies it attempted to subsume, as well as the ability of those groups to respond to and resist 
colonial penetration. As Marsden and Hopkins have argued, pervasive and simplistic accounts of 
this region have obscured our ability to make sense both of the populations who lived there and of 
their interactions with colonialism.100 While it is beyond the scope of this article to reconstruct 
Mahsud resistance in greater detail (though such work is overdue), we have seen how interactions 
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between the Mahsuds and the colonial state were complex, multi-faceted and dynamic. As the 
examples here make clear, the frontier encounter was always reciprocal and negotiated. 
Allowances, recruitment, hostages, requisitioning and colonization schemes all offered 
opportunities for the Mahsuds to mediate, deflect, appropriate and bend colonial interventions to 
their own interests. Flexibility and engagement, not fanaticism or flight, marked indigenous 
resistance to colonial incursions in South Waziristan. The depiction of the Mahsuds – and Pashtuns 
more generally – as implacable opponents of colonialism is unhelpful, and sustaining this vision 
requires us to overlook the considerable evidence of cooperation and collaboration. The Mahsud 
propensity to repeatedly thwart colonial ambitions lies not in some unchanging form of ‘tribal 
culture’, but in the dynamics which shape that most common human endeavour: the political 
struggle to produce and resist power.  
As policy-makers and historians raid the colonial archive to provide perspective on 
contemporary conflicts, it seems both timely and necessary to reassert the possibility, and the 
value, of more critical histories of empire. If Britain’s imperial history has lessons to offer, they 
concern the hubris of essentialism and the dangers of instrumentalism. Recognising what was 
common to the antagonists of the nineteenth century may help to complicate the binaries that so 
limit understandings of ongoing conflicts in South Asia and beyond. Without a better 
understanding of how imperial power operated – and how it was resisted – we will learn nothing 
from history, except that nothing can be learned from history. 
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